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ABSTRACT
Arada Locomate On-Board Unit is a vehicle-to-vehicle communication device that supports the
WAVE protocol, which is the standard for vehicle to vehicle communication. Successful attacks on
the device could be used to control the behavior of the connected vehicle. This creative component
assesses the security of the device and discusses the vulnerabilities of the applications installed
on the device. It reports about our results to exploit the known vulnerabilities of Dropbear ssh,
Busybox telnet, and the linux kernel, which are installed on the device and discusses how to obtain
the private keys of the device to use them for attacks. In addition, it describes our investigation of
the existence of exploitable buffer overflow in the usbd program, which accepts messages through
port 6666 (IRC port). The results are: the exploitation of Dropbear ssh, Busybox telnet failed, the
exploitation of the vmsplice vulnerability in the Linux kernel required adapting the exploit to the
MIPS architecture, there is no exploitable buffer overflow in the usbd; however, the private keys
of the device are easily accessible and the user password of the device could be changed without
authentication. The current results are not that useful to stage attacks but further work may lead
to exploit the device and use it to inject messages to the connected vehicle, e.g., develop an exploit
for vmsplice vulnerability for MIPS Linux.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The field of automotive electronics has been a developing field in recent times which involves
various machine learning techniques, reliable communication protocols, and accurate image pro-
cessing techniques integrated to give a user-friendly and self-driving autonomous car. With new
innovations and new patches of code released every day, there comes security issues without the
developers being aware of the code fragments that have vulnerabilities. This poses a great threat
to deploy the units before rigorously testing them with regards to security.
Each manufacturer has their own interfaces and software supporting them, which can allow an
attacker to meddle around different platforms and perform any attacks. Vehicle to Any (V2X)
communication is also enabled, which leads to a situation where cars can operate through mobile
communication standards like LTE and 5G. Also, a lot of cars are enabled to have a Over The
Air (OTA) upgrades which enable a greater scenario like a man-in-the-middle attack.
1.1 Problem
Network-based architectures increase the level of accessibility to different aspects and informa-
tion of the hardware. The Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) protocol is a WiFi-based protocol that can
lead to various vulnerabilities in the system. Any data sent or received can be sniffed, spoofed
and that can further be used to jam the network. Also, the software used can have vulnerabilities
that attackers can take advantage of. The solution for this is a standardized process that acts as
an evaluation of the system entirely before being deployed in the market.The research answers the
following question:
Is the V2V system ARADA Locomate On Board Unit(OBU) secure?
21.2 Approach
The goal of the research was to study the hardware and perform security testing on a V2V
architecture-based device. Arada Systems is one of the companies that work on developing V2V
architecture-based devices. These devices find use in the Platooning trucks, cars, etc.
As the first step, the features and the software the device supports are studied. The next step
in the process is to analyze the device and develop a flaw hypothesis. Later, the hypothesis is tested
using various tools and other methods that give us complete knowledge on what part of the device
is vulnerable.
1.3 Hardware
The system selected for study here is Arada Locamate On Board Unit (OBU) which acts as a
user side unit in the network. The OBU is based on the WAVE protocol which is a WiFi-based
protocol for V2V networks. It also has support for CAN bus. Figures 1.1 & 1.2 shows the Arada
Locomate On-Board Unit.
1.4 Organization
This creative component is organized into 6 chapters. After this introductory chapter, chapter
2 deals with the background required for this research and also different tools that were used in
the process. Chapter 3 discusses related work with the V2V implementations. Chapter 4 describes
the flaw hypothesis for Arada Locomate OBU and also the experiments conducted on the system.
Chapter 5 focuses on the flaw that was detected to study in detail. Finally, the conclusion and
future work are discussed in Chapter 6.
3Figure 1.1 Front view of Arada Locomate OBU
Figure 1.2 Rear view of Arada Locomate OBU
4CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Arada Locomate On-Board Unit
Arada Systems is a company that focuses on providing technological solutions including auto-
motive and security. One of the products of Arada Systems for V2V communication between cars
is Arada Locomate OBU. The OBU acts as the in-unit entity and the Road Side Unit (RSU) acts
as the master entity collecting data from many OBU’s. The RSU then processes the details and
shares them with the other OBUs to coordinate among the vehicles, resulting in a safer autonomous
functioning. The OBU and RSU both transfer a message called Basic Safety Message (BSM) which
is essentially the critical data of the car. The BSM contains the GPS location, speed, and RPM
which are also customizable by the manufacturer.
The following are the features of Arada Locomate OBU:
• Platform: Linux 2.6.23
• SDK with C libraries
• Interactive communication- SSH/Telnet
• Support for CAN bus
• WAVE protocol
• 16MB flash
• 64MB SDRAM
• Supports encryption of messages
The interfaces that the system supports are:
• USB
5• Ethernet
• GPS Antenna
• DSRC Antenna
• JTAG
• Bluetooth
• WPS
• DB9 for CAN bus support
2.2 Penetration testing tools
Penetration testing tools act as an essential part of the experimenting stage. There is a broad set
of tools that can help acquiring information and creating exploits. The following sections describe
the tools such as Nmap, Metasploit, and Binwalk used in the project.
2.2.1 NMAP
Network Mapper (Nmap) [1] is an open source software that acts as a platform scanner and
evaluates different services that run on the hosts. The features of Nmap include host discovery, port
scanning, version detection, and Operating systems(OS) detection. As mentioned earlier, Nmap
detects any host in the network and scan all the open ports associated with the host. It can also
be used to detect the OS running on the target machine.
The usage of Nmap command is:
nmap [options] IP Address
The options here can range according to the output required.
In our case, we require the service running of each port and the version of the services. So the
−sV option is used. Also, 192.168.0.40 is the pre-set IP address of Arada Locomate OBU. So the
command in our case is as follows:
6nmap − sV 192.168.0.40
2.2.2 Metasploit
Metasploit [2] is a security platform that offers details about various vulnerabilities in services
and also provides a platform to develop exploits that can run over the network. In this project,
Metasploit was used to get information about vulnerabilities of the services running on the OBU
machine. Also, in the penetration testing process, it was used to test with the previously found
exploits in the database.
2.2.3 Binwalk
In general, firmware images are compressed images that contain a kernel and a root file sys-
tem. These are not common compression formats and are uniquely designed to satisfy the memory
constraints. One of the Kali Linux-based tools used for analyzing the firmware images/executa-
bles/binaries is Binwalk which is best when firmware images are the test item.
The usage of this utility is as given below:
binwalk [options] Firmware image
The options are set in various categories as seen in [3].
In our case, the root file system had to be extracted that demanded Binwalk to use file extraction
options. The compressed file used in our case was the rootsqaushfs file. So the command in our
case is:
binwalk − e rootfilesystem.squashfs
where e specifies the Binwalk to extract the file in the current location.
2.3 Reverse Engineering tools
2.3.1 Radare2
Radare2 [4] is an open source framework used for reverse engineering, debugging, and analyzing
binaries. A GUI version is also available. Radare2 supports various formats of files like ELF,
7MZ, Java class, and file systems. It also supports a broad range of instruction sets like Intel x86,
MIPS, and ARM. Radare2 supports static analysis including disassembling the binary, extracting
information from symbols, and also dynamic analysis including support for a built-in low-level
debugger. In this project, Radare2 is used to acquire the basic understanding of the program and
to reassure the definition of port 6666 through the call graph.
The command to call radare2 is either r2 or radare2 with the options and executable path.
radare2 [−options] /path/to/binary
Various options are present for different functionality. The project requires the disassembly of
the executable and obtain the call-graph which demands the usage of the following command:
Command 1: r2 /path/to/binary
Command 2: agf > output.dot
Here the flags agf in command 2 indicates to disassemble, output the graphs into the file
specified.
Radare2 uses Graph viz tool for constructing call graphs. The supported format is .dot which
requires another step to convert to pdf as follows:
dot − Tpdf output.dot − o output.pdf
2.3.2 IDA Pro
Interactive Disassembler (IDA)Pro [5] is a popular proprietary disassembler used for program
dis-assembly and debugging binaries. It is a GUI-based platform and is designed to provide user-
friendly functionality. It supports Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X hosts. The recognized file
formats include ELF, MZ, and Mach-O. It supports a wide range of instruction sets including Intel
x86, MIPS, and ARM. It also supports compilers like Borland C, Microsoft C, and GNU C++.
Important features of IDA include automatic code analysis and knowledge of API call parameters.
In this project, IDA Pro was used to study the entire program and also to observe all the functions
tied to the usbd program.
8Usage of the software is straightforward. Select the file to disassemble once the IDA pro appli-
cation starts. As a result, the IDA view tabs open. The main view includes the disassembled code.
A user can switch between Graph view to view the call graph. There is an option for the Hex view
as well. The other windows include Imports, Names, Functions, Strings, Stack view, etc. In this
project, graphical view, functions and stack views were the important views used to analyze the
program.
2.4 Debugging tools
2.4.1 QEMU Emulator
Quick Emulator (QEMU) [6] is an emulator to provide hardware virtualization functionality,
and it is an open source software [7]. It supports a broad range of operating systems and also
a broad range of instruction set architectures. It also has an option of saving and restoring the
machine at the current state. The architectures supported by QEMU are x86, MIPS, SPARC,
Microblaze, etc.
In this project, Linux OS is emulated in a MIPS based kernel system. The command for using
QEMU through command line is:
qemu − system −mips −M malta − kernel vmlinux − 3.2.0 − 4 − 4kc −malta −
hda debian wheezy mips standard.qcow2 − append ”root = /dev/sda1” − nographic
Here the qemu-system-mips instructs the QEMU to use MIPS architecture for the instruction
set. Also the -kernel allows us to specify the kernel image. The -hda enables us to define the
root file system that the QEMU will have upon starting the emulator. We can also open ports for
communication using −redir flag in the above command.
2.4.2 Cross Compilation
Software can be cross-compiled for any architecture. Cross compilation is necessary if a user
wants to compile any code fragment for another architecture from the availability of system with
9different architecture. The -target variable points to the required architecture in order to perform
the cross-compilation.
In this project,GDB debugger [8] is cross-compiled for the hardware that is MIPS based. The
cross compilation is done through the configure file. The commands for successful cross compilation
are:
Command 1: exportLDFLAGS = static
Command 2: ./configure − −target = mips − linux − gnu CC = ”mips − linux −
gnu− gcc” CXX = ””mips− linux− gnu− gcc”
Command 3: make
Here LDFLAGS is set as static which builds a GDB executable with statically linked libraries.
–target specifies the required architecture and the CC and CXX flags instructs the compiler to
use MIPS based libraries. Once the make is successful, the GDB folder contains the executable to
transfer to the target device.
However, the cross-compiled versions of GDB did not work in the hardware as the OS is a
proprietary version of Linux which may restrict the usage of cross-compiled versions. The figures
2.1 & 2.2 shows the two GDB cross compiled versions that failed to execute.
2.4.3 GDB
GNU Debugger (GDB) is available for various platforms and also supports debugging for various
architectures. In this project, GDB was used to debug the code for any overflow in the program
stack due to the presence of buffer overflow vulnerability. The breakpoints are set near the function
that was suspected to have a buffer overflow.
The following commands show how to start gdb and set a breakpoint. Chapter 5 discusses
further steps to analyze the program stack.
Command 1: gdb usbd
Command 2: break read()
Command 3: run
10
Figure 2.1 Cross compiled version 1
Figure 2.2 Cross compiled version 2
11
Command 4: c
The gdb command followed by the program runs gdb bound with the program. Then the
breakpoints are set using break or b followed by function name. Usage of run command will
execute the program until it reaches read() and stops. Type the command continue or c to continue
program execution. In a program, there is no limit on the number of breakpoints.
12
CHAPTER 3. RELATED WORK
This chapter discusses the current and previously existing research on security towards automo-
tive communication protocols. The first section talks about the use of telematics and its importance
in automobiles. The second section discusses how vulnerable Controller Area Network(CAN) is to
attacks. It also explains the steps that can be taken to prevent the attacks against it. Finally, the
third section discusses the attacks and vulnerabilities due to modern technologies used in modern
vehicles.
3.1 Telematics in modern vehicles
As emphasized in [12] by Yilin Zhao, the modern society is rapidly growing with the usage
of advanced technologies like Telematics. Telematics is the use of telecommunication to receive
and send data over to different places. Since telecommunication is a standard for communication,
the automotive sector has adapted to the usage of these technologies to improve user experience
and safety. One of the best examples of telecommunication in automobiles is the mayday system
which connects the vehicle to the nearby roadside services during an emergency as emphasized
in [12]. The mayday system shares the location of the vehicle through the Global Positioning
System(GPS) giving the exact location of the vehicle to roadside assistance teams. The entire
process uses cellular communication to send and receive data over the internet or through the
Short Messaging Service(SMS). Although this increases the user safety, it increases the risks too.
Modern cars also use WiFi for vehicle-to-vehicle communication which brings in possibilities to
take control of the network. Usage of LTE for current automotive is also under development which
again raises security issues. Incorporating telecommunications in automotive is one of the best
technological advancements, but it has the possibility of security breaches.
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3.2 CAN bus security
Controller Area Network(CAN) bus is the brain of automobiles that contains all the important
data communicated between various devices in the car. The architecture of CAN bus is such
that, there are no encryption policies that can shield the CAN bus from being accessed. This
poses a major threat if an attacker has access to the car. An attacker can sniff and spoof the
CAN diagnostic packets or modify the firmware in the Electronic Control Units(ECUs) to acquire
control over the vehicle units [13]. Various methods and steps can be followed to take control over
the CAN network one of which is reverse engineering the CAN bus data and use tools to replay
the manipulated data into the CAN bus [14], although the process requires physical access to the
CAN bus. Two methods to safeguard the system from those types of attacks are the intrusion
detection technique which stand out to be one of the best to detect,study the pattern of attacks,
and create a detection method to prevent attacks. The second method is the forensic support which
also proves to be one of the best [15]. Denial of service attacks is a common method followed in
any network based devices and CAN is also vulnerable to these attacks. Also, reverse engineering a
CAN bus or a firmware gives us ample access to take control over the vehicle [16]. In recent times,
the use of various interfaces with CAN data will also increase the threat in vehicular network access
demanding a study of every software in the car before deployment.
3.3 Security analysis of modern automotive technologies
With the increase of connectivity in vehicles, the increase in security threats also can be ob-
served. In 2016, the experiments on Teslas Model S shows the ability to control various functions
of the car from opening trunk to activating brakes while the vehicle is in motion. The attack
was possible due to a vulnerability found in the web browser used in Teslas firmware and when
connected to a malicious WiFi hotspot, the attacker was able to take control of the vehicle [17].
Alternatively, an infotainment system can give access to the cars critical data and a proprietary
mobile application developer can gain access to the CAN bus thereby taking control of the system.
The possibilities of heap overflows vulnerabilities in these applications allows the attacker to gain
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remote access thereby causing a significant threat in these applications [18]. The buffer overflow
attacks through a Bluetooth interface poses an important threat as there is a possibility of crashing
the system and obtain control of the vehicle. There are various types of buffer overflow like the
presence of strcpy without proper size check which leads to a critical security threat [19]. This
discussion summarises various risks in the modern automobile network and the emphasising the
need for countermeasures.
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CHAPTER 4. PENETRATION TESTING OF ARADA LOCOMATE
This chapter discusses the security testing in the Arada Locomate V2V hardware. The intro-
duction presents the open ports and the versions of software running on the system. The hypothesis
section discusses the flaw hypothesis based on the versions of the software and the other potential
flaws of the device. Finally, the experiment sections discuss the different flaws in detail and the
steps to test the hypothesis.
4.1 Introduction
Penetration testing has become an essential part of testing the products. It provides an insight
into the technical flaws in the development especially in regards to security. The main tools used
here are Nmap for port analysis, Metasploit for exploits, Binwalk for firmware analysis.
Nmap is a Linux based tool which provides information about the open ports in a system. It
also helps in acquiring details about the software that runs in those ports. The Nmap also can
check the OS running in the target device (Linux 2.6 in Arada Locomate OBU) and provides us
with complete information about the system. Chapter 2 discusses the commands to use Nmap.
Table 4.1 shows the output of Nmap. The flaws possible with these versions can be searched in the
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures website [9]. The next section discusses the potential flaws
in the system.
Table 4.1 Open ports of Arada Locomate.
Port No. TCP/UDP Type Program Version
22 TCP SSH Dropbear 0.51
23 TCP Telnet Busybox 1.11
6666 TCP IRC Refer Sec. 4.3.4 Refer Sec. 4.3.4
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Table 4.2 Flaw Hypothesis for programs in Arada Locomate.
Program Version CVE No. Description
Linux Kernel 2.6.23 CVE-2008-0600 Linux kernel syscall vmsplice
vulnerability which allows privi-
lege escalation
Dropbear SSH 0.51 CVE-2016-3116 Arbitrary xauth command injec-
tion to gain read/write access
Busybox Telnet 1.11 N/A Telnet crashes when a long string
is sent for Username and pass-
word while logging in
USB Daemon N/A N/A Open port can have a buffer over-
flow vulnerability
4.2 Flaw Hypothesis
This step is the third step in the penetration testing. It involves studying the versions of
software and define hypothesis of possible flaws in the device. The table 4.2 defines the hypothesis
found in each software. The next section addresses the vulnerabilities in detail and presents the
conducted experiments.
4.3 Experiments
4.3.1 Dropbear Xauth vulnerability
Dropbear is the SSH client and server side software. It is an open source software that supports
Linux platform especially Embedded Linux. It finds use in router systems and ethernet switches.
It supports xauth, which is used to acquire information from the X server. The X server extracts
data from one machine to another. The vulnerability is in the case when an unauthenticated user
can perform these actions. From xauth command, the attacker can get information about the
environment, write file,connect to another port, and run exploits.
The Metasploit tool contains an exploit for this vulnerability. This exploit was used on the
hardware as shown in Figure 4.1. It returned the status of Xauth not found. Also in firmware
analysis described at a further section, there were no configuration files for Xauth which proves that
the Xauth is not present. Thus the system is not vulnerable to the Dropbear Xauth vulnerability.
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Figure 4.1 Dropbear Xauth exploit
4.3.2 Vmsplice privilege escalation
Linux Kernels are an integral part of any computer that works with Linux OS. The kernel
level operations should be highly secure as any vulnerability here can cause an entire breach of
the system, and an attacker can take full access over the system. This vulnerability deals with a
system call that Linux kernel version 2.6 supports [10]. Arada Locomate has a proprietary variant
of Linux 2.6.23 as seen from the output of Nmap.
The vulnerability is with the splice() system call which helps in data flow plumbing within
the kernel. Data flow plumbing is a process which provides easy and efficient management of
data, data processing and storing. This helps in the increased ease of data access. The splice()
system calls take two file descriptors as input one being the source and the other destination. It
copies data from a source file to a destination file and splices it together. This functionality will
essentially allow writing a trivial code or information into the destination file. A variant of splice()
is vmsplice() system call, which does the same process, but the destination here is memory used by
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Figure 4.2 Linux vmsplice() exploit
the program. The vulnerability was found in this system call where the vmsplice() missed checking
the permissions of the source file. Because of this, any user can indeed write to the memory through
the pipe that the kernel copies and writes to the memory which is a huge path for an attacker to
take control over the system.
Also, there was another issue with the same system call that is the reverse of the situation
discussed above. When the source is the memory, and the destination is a file with vmsplice()
system call, the kernel works by reading the iovec structures which describe the memory range of
the source. Here, the vmsplice() omitted checks on whether the memory was readable which allows
attackers to get information about the memory and the system on the whole. An exploit for
this is present for Intel x86 architecture based machines[20]. Figure 4.2 shows the exploits tried
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in the initial experiments which did not give desirable results. The firmware analysis discussed in
further sections revealed that the system is MIPS architecture based which will require the exploit
to be modified accordingly. This exploit, when revised for MIPS architecture, will be one of the
best exploits that an attacker can take advantage of.
4.3.3 Busybox Crash
BusyBox is known as the Swiss Army Knife of Embedded Linux which is a utility program that
groups many common Linux utilities in a tiny executable. It also acts as an efficient alternative to
the GNU Coreutils that takes care of the Linux utilities. BusyBox considers the resource constraints
and memory constraints in Embedded devices. Although, it does not support all the functionalities
that the counterparts offer. BusyBox is also configurable which allows the developers to enable
only the utilities that they think are required and opt out of the other utilities. Due to this feature,
the end executable is less in size which aids the Embedded devices. The version of BusyBox in
Arada Locomate is 1.11 as we can see from Nmap.
BusyBox supports commands like chmod, echo, telnet and many more. The hypothesis here is
to monitor the reaction of telnet port to an input string of high length. The fuzzer code in Listing
4.1 is the fuzzer program that was used to fuzz the Telnet port. The listing 4.1 contains the
Python code snippet for fuzzing the Telnet port 23. The code creates a host variable representing
the IP address of the Arada Locomate which is static IPAddress : 192.168.0.40, the port variable
is declared and initiated to 23 describing the Telnet port number. The size of the string sent is
handled using length variable which is used to increase the length of ’C’ from 250 until the program
crashes. The while loop is used to keep injecting the data into the guest port until an interrupt
raises. In the loop, a socket variable is declared, and the socket is defined. Connect () checks if the
host and guest port are connected. The output variable will contain a string of a command ’USER’
with ’C’ and the number of C’s is set using length variable. The ’USER’ command specifies that
the input is for the user name while logging in through telnet. The same is done for the password
as indicated in lines 10 and 11. The recv() command helps in getting the reply from the target. If
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Listing 4.1 Code snippet of the Port 6666 Fuzzer
1 import sys , socket , time
2 host = ”192 . 168 . 0 . 40” //IP Address
3 port = i n t (23) // Port Number
4 l ength =256 // I n i t i a l l ength o f the s t r i n g
5 whi l e ( 1 ) :
6 c l i e n t = socket . socke t ( socke t . AF INET , socket .SOCK STREAM)
7 // Dec lare a TCP socket
8 c l i e n t . connect ( ( host , port ) )
9 // Connect to user−supp l i ed port and IP address
10 output = ”USERNAME ” + ”C” ∗ l ength
11 c l i e n t . s e n d a l l ( output . encode ( ’ ut f −8 ’))
12 output1 = ”PASSWORD ” + ”C” ∗ l ength
13 c l i e n t . s e n d a l l ( output1 . encode ( ’ ut f −8 ’))
14 p r in t ( c l i e n t . recv (1024) ) // Recieve Reply
15 c l i e n t . c l o s e ( ) // Close the connect ion
16 p r in t (” Length Sent : ” + s t r ( l ength )
17 l ength += 100
it does not reply or if it hangs, the recv() keeps waiting for the reply which will cause the fuzzer to
time out indicating a crash. The sendall() function sends the string to the port. Then, the length
of the string is printed in the command line, and the length is increased by 100.
After a certain length, telnet stops accepting data, and the fuzzing program also stops sending
data into it representing that the telnet service is crashed causing a denial of service. To recheck
the result of the above process, a user can try logging into the system. The telnet does not react
for the command and remains frozen. This lead to a successful crash of the Telnet port which can
cause problems with hardwares functionality, although this only occurred once. Thus, this attack
constitutes a failure. The above attack can further be investigated if there is a presence of buffer
overflow or just a crash using GDB debugger.
To regain the telnet functionality, one has to restart the hardware which is not a reliable option
when the car is running since it can lead to a dangerous situation for the driver and the other
vehicles connected to the network.
21
4.3.4 USB Daemon
The program that opens the port 6666 can be obtained using a Linux command which gives
the program that enables the port to move to open state. The command is as shown below.
fuser tcp/6666
The fuser command is used to identify the file or process using the specified socket. The program
that uses the port 6666 is usbd. However, the port is only opened for 10 seconds every 1.5 minutes.
Also, the port 6666 has a history of incidents where it was reported being used by Trojans and
Malware in different systems [11]. This lead to a hypothesis over the usbd program. The program
is reverse engineered and discussed in Chapter 5.
4.3.5 Admin user vulnerability
The admin user is for the real world users who have commands and applications that enable the
users to run applications they require. The admin user does not need a password and has limited
capability. Figure 4.3 shows the applications for the admin user. One of the options is the password
option. It takes the new password string as an argument as shown below that changes the root
password to Sudharrshan. The problem here is, it does not check for the current password and
directly changes the root password to Sudharrshan which is a major flaw with the application. Any
user can use this flaw and take control of the system without trying any exploits. This vulnerability
is a major success. Figure 4.3 shows the entire process explained above.
password Sudharrshan
4.3.6 Encryption keys and certificates
The previous vulnerability gives root user privileges which allow taking complete control of
the entire device. The /tmp folder, in general, will contain the keys created for encryption in the
machines. The /tmp had various keys and certificates as shown in Figure 4.4
Figure 4.5 shows the decoded keys that helps reading the messages sent over to other devices.
The keys pave the way for sniffing the data between two devices. Once sniffed, the attacker can
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Figure 4.3 Admin user applications
Figure 4.4 Encryption keys & certificates
spoof the data with malicious content, and jam the communication for a man-in-the-middle attack.
This procedure also constitutes a flaw of the device.
4.3.7 Firmware analysis
Binwalk is a Kali Linux based tool that extracts the root file system from the compressed files
and provide the files in the root file system. Chapter 2 describes the usage of this tool. Important
findings are:
Figure 4.5 Base64 decoded private key
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Figure 4.6 List of programs and locations
• The etc. folder had passwd file containing execs for each interface and ports. Also, it has
keys for dropbear.
• The /usrs local had a python2.6 folder. But it was empty
• /lib had files including socketCAN and watchdog
• /bin had the busybox executable and links of other Linux command executables
As we expected, Busybox is the telnet client, and Dropbear is the used ssh client. The firmware
might support python based codes too. We can also see it has support for CAN bus as SOCKET-
CAN is present. Also from the files, we can observe the interfaces, users, and locations of executable
of each interface as shown in Figure 4.6. Also, the xauth was not present in Figure 4.6 which proves
that there is no X server in the firmware.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the various aspects of penetration testing of Arada Locomate On
Board Unit and found the open ports and hypothesized over the vulnerabilities that the services
of each port had. Based on the hypothesis, various experiments and exploits were discussed, and
24
a suspicious program called usbd was decided to be analyzed more. Also, a firmware analysis was
conducted to bolster the findings through penetration testing.
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CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS OF PORT 6666
This chapter discusses the usbd program that accepts messages through port 6666. The reverse
engineering tools section discusses the two different tools that were used to reverse engineer the
program. The usbd program section describes the program in detail including the main function and
the other functions tied with the program. The hypothesis section describes where the vulnerability
for buffer overflow is suspected. The next section describes the fuzzer used to test the 6666 port
and the stack data are studied to inspect the reaction of the code to the values sent. Finally, the
result is discussed.
5.1 Introduction
The analysis of the usbd program was motivated due to the fact that port 6666 is mostly
used by malware and trojans. IDA pro and Radare2 are the tools that are available for program
disassembly. The possibility of a buffer overflow in such ports allows for penetrating through the
system. The presence of port 6666 in the program was confirmed by reverse engineering through
Radare2, and later stages of the code inspection were performed through IDA Pro. Also, the
injection and monitoring of stack were conducted in an emulator with GDB debugger installed as
discussed in further sections.
5.2 USBD Program
The code was analyzed using IDA Pro revealing that the executable is a USB Daemon which
acts as the setup program that aids the connection between the hardware and the USB drive. In
addition to this functionality, this program also logs the Ethernet and WLAN packets in the USB
drive. The important functions of this program are described in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.1 Switch case and relevant figures
Case Relevant figure
Case 0,4, default 5.10
Case1 5.6 & 5.7
Case 2 5.8
Case 3 5.9 & 5.10
Case 5 5.11 & 5.12
Case 6 5.6 & 5.7
Case 7 5.9 & 5.10
Figure 5.1 Start of main function
The program is described below and the figures 5.1 to 5.12 show the control flow graph. The
usbd program acts as a USB daemon used to connect the hardware and the USB device. The
main function first checks the firmware details by uname command in Linux as shown in Figure
5.1. Then it creates a multithreading application with one thread taking the usage of USB and
the other thread going to the usbd server function as shown in Figure 5.2. This function opens
the port 6666 and finishes the network setup functions as discussed in 5.2 and shown in Figures
5.3 & 5.4. After the setup, the read function reads from the file descriptor of the input and then
another variable is used to select the case to be executed. The various switch cases in the program
are shown in Table 5.3. Figure 5.5 to 5.12 illustrate switch cases 1 to 8 . Once the usbd server
finishes, the control is sent back to the main program and the program terminates.
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Figure 5.2 usbd server function call
5.3 Buffer overflow hypothesis
A buffer overflow happens when the size of the input is not moderated either while reading or
processing it in the memory. The read() function constitutes the function that reads data from
the port. This hypothesis is based on the read function to test if it can acquire more data than
specified as a maximum in the function call. If the read() allows reading more than the maximum
size specified, then the buffer overflow can be performed which can give access to the program
stack. The next section describes the experiments conducted to test the hypothesis.
5.4 Injection attack on port 6666
Inspecting the stack of the program requires a debugger running in the system. Arada Locomate
is proprietary hardware that has customized Linux version, selected libraries and commands. In
addition to it, the file system is a Read-Only file system which restricts the hacker’s accessibility. To
setup debugger in the hardware, a cross-compiled GDB executable with statically linked libraries
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Figure 5.3 Port 6666 opening Figure 5.4 Network setup functions
Listing 5.1 Code snippet of the Port 6666 Fuzzer
1 import sys , socket , time
2 host = ” 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 ” // Address o f emulator i s through l o c a l h o s t
3 port = i n t (6666) // Def ine the port
4 l ength =250 // I n i t i a l Length o f the s t r i n g
5 whi l e ( 1 ) :
6 c l i e n t = socket . socke t ( socke t . AF INET , socket .SOCK STREAM)
7 // Create a socket v a r i a b l e
8 c l i e n t . connect ( ( host , port ) ) // connect to the port
9 output = ”C”∗ l ength
10 c l i e n t . s e n d a l l ( output . encode ( ’ ut f −8 ’))
11 c l i e n t . c l o s e ( )
12 p r in t (” Length Sent : ” + s t r ( l ength )
13 l ength += 100
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Figure 5.5 Read function
was built that supports MIPS 32 version of the hardware. But, the results show that the GDB was
unable to run due to a customized Linux version.
The alternative is to use an emulator that recreates the firmware and root file system of the
hardware. An added advantage with the emulator is that it allows the user to perform unlimited
control over the firmware. QEMU emulator supports various architecture as discussed, and the
setup was done using a MIPS based kernel. GDB packages were installed in the emulator and
content of the root file system from firmware analysis was copied to the emulator. After the setup
of the emulator, the usbd program is run using GDB which gives full access to the program stack.
A fuzzer code as discussed below is run from the host computer. The reaction of the program can
be tracked by analyzing the stack data. The following section discusses the fuzzer code, stack data,
and the result.
5.4.1 Port 6666 fuzzer
The listing 5.1 contains the Python code snippet for fuzzing the port 6666. The code creates a
host variable representing the IP address of the guest, and the port variable is declared and initiated
to 6666 describing the port number. The size of the string is handled using length variable which
is used to increase the length of ’C’ from 250 until the stack overflows. The while loop is used to
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Figure 5.6 Switch case 1 & 6 (a)
Figure 5.7 Switch case 1 & 6 (b)
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Figure 5.8 Switch case 2
keep injecting the data into a guest port until an interrupt occurs. In the loop, a socket variable
is declared, and the socket is defined. Connect () checks if the host and guest port are connected.
The output variable will contain a string of ’C’ and the number of C’s is set using length variable.
The sendall() function sends the string to the port. Then, the length of the string is printed in the
command line, and the length is increased by 100.
5.4.2 Program stack
The program stack is monitored through GDB debugger which allows us to set breakpoints,
observe the buffer until the breakpoint, etc. The program is run in gdb, and the fuzzer program is
started from the host computer. The data read from the port is stored in a variable called usbsock
with size 256 bytes. Monitor the usbsock in GDB for a possibility of buffer overflow. The command
to find the address of usbsock is:
print &usbsock
The above command prints the address location of the start of the variable. In the usbd
program, the address of usbsock is 0x416c40. Observe the buffer from this point, and locate the
memory locations with 0x43(ASCII value of ’C’). The command to find the memory in general and
usbsock in our case is as specified below.
x/FMT Address
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Figure 5.9 Switch case 3 & 7 (a)
Figure 5.10 Switch case 3 & 7 (b), cases 0, 4 ,default
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Figure 5.11 Switch case 5 (a) Figure 5.12 Switch case 5 (b)
where x represents the memory and format can be specified to observer bytes or string
etc. followed by the address to observe
x/300xb 0x416c40
Here the 300 refers to the size of buffer starting from a specified address to display. The ’x’
followed by 300, points the command to display the content in hexadecimal and also the ’b’ points
the command to display byte by byte.
Figure 5.13 Stack content at start of usbsock
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Figure 5.14 Stack content at end of usbsock
The output at the starting of the buffer is as shown in Figure 5.13. The hypothesis over the
read() function involves the size of input that the stack can take. The read() specifies the size of
the stack as 256 bytes. To test the hypothesis, the content after 256 bytes from 0x416c40 should
be observed to see if it exceeds the 256 bytes. Figure 5.14 shows the content of the stack at the
end of the 256 bytes.
5.4.3 Result
From Figure 5.14, we can see that the system does not overwrite the buffer with 0x43 after 256
bytes from the start of 0x416c40 also does not crash with a segmentation fault which proves that
there is no buffer overflow at the port read() function.
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Table 5.2 Description of functions in the usbd program.
Function Description
Main () The main() function initializes the variables required, calls the options() that dis-
plays the help manual of the program. It then sets up the multithreading environ-
ment. Next, it calls the USB Usage() function which calculates the free space in
the USB and checks if it is under the threshold range. In Parallel, the other thread
calls the usbd server() function, and the further sections describe its functionality.
The main program reaches an end after both the thread execution terminates.
USB Usage() The USB Usage() function calls the df Linux command, checks the file system and
available memory and returns a flag if there is enough space in the USB.
scp filels() The scp filels() function calls the mv command to move all the files from the source
to the destination.
scp status() The scp status() function checks the status of the file copy. It checks if the file
copy functionality is completed or not and returns the status as an input to the
usbd server().
bind() The bind() function is one of the important socket programming functions. It takes
the socket file descriptor, socket address, and size of the socket address as input.
This function assigns the socket address to the defined socket using the socket file
descriptor. It returns 0 on success.
htons() The htons() function converts the host byte order to network byte order which takes
care of the endianness in the network systems.
listen() The listen() function is also one of the important socket programming functions.
It takes the socket file descriptor and backlog as input. This function enables the
socket file descriptor to have the ability to accept data. The backlog is the maximum
number of pending connections that the port can allow. It returns 0 on success.
accept() The accept() function is also one of the important socket programming functions.
It takes the socket file descriptor, socket address, size of the socket address and flags
as input. It accepts the first connection request from listen() and enables the port
to accept data.
close() The close() function is also one of the important socket programming functions. It
takes the socket file descriptor as input. Close() frees the file descriptor from the
port it is assigned to and terminates the connection.
read() The read() function is also one of the important socket programming functions. It
takes the socket file descriptor, buffer variable, and count as input. This function
reads the maximum count of bytes from the file specified by socket file descriptor
and stores it in the buffer.
usbd server() The usbd server() function is the most important function of the usbd program.
This function starts by printing that the program is in the usbd server and defines
the socket as a TCP/IP socket. Port 6666 is declared and htons function is called
to take care of the endianness. Then the bind() and listen() functions are called for
setting up the port. Next, a thread is created to take care of the interrupts from the
program and hardware. The next step is to select the file descriptors to handle. If
there is no file descriptor to work on, the control passes back to the thread creation.
Once a file descriptor is selected, it calls the accept() to enable the port to accept
data. Then, the 264-byte usbsock buffer is declared which is used in the read()
to read data. After that, a variable is read and used in a switch case to perform
different functions in each case, as described in Table 5.3. Once the switch case
terminates, the thread terminates, and the control transfers to main()
36
Table 5.3 Description of switch cases in usbd server() program.
Case Description
Case 0,4, default This case stores the comment Unknown command in the log file.
Case1 This case creates a folder in the USB called ModelDeployment using the mkdir
command. Next, it compares if WLAN capture folder is present and then copies
the WLAN packet files from the hardware to the USB. If any error occurs, the log
file stores the status.
Case 2 This case calls the scp status() function to check the file copy status
Case 3 This case is similar to case 7, but it overwrites the data if the USB is full.
Case 5 This case rechecks the USB size, calls the list() which uses the ls command to list
all the files in the folder. Next, the files specified in the list() are flushed out from
the USB using the rm command to free space.
Case 6 This case creates a folder in the USB called ModelDeployment using the mkdir
command. Next, it compares if the ethernet capture folder is present and then
copies the ethernet packet files from the hardware to the USB. If any error occurs,
the log file stores the status.
Case 7 This case calls the USB Usage() function to check the free space available in the
USB.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Conclusion
Arada locomate is one of the V2V devices in the market. It has a customized Linux version for
the OS. A detailed port analysis of the hardware can reveal any flaws present in the implementation
and give the developers a way to alter the programs before deployment. Penetration testing was
done to gain an in-depth understanding of the hardware. Port analysis and program analysis
combined provided a clear idea of the implementations of software in the device. The hypothesized
buffer overflow vulnerability was also tested showing that the program using port 6666 was resistant
to buffer overflow attacks. The results of the vmsplice experiments also show that the Linux version
is susceptible to vmsplice exploit which gives privilege escalation. Generally, sending largely sized
inputs on the telnet port is a method to cause a denial of service, but the result of this test showed
that the device is safe from this attack. Thus, this study helps to perform required changes in the
future firmware upgrades and a secure platform for V2V communications.
6.2 Future work
Few of the tests remain for future work due to lack of time. The flaw hypothesis in chapter
4 discusses a few tests which need to be modified or studied more and customized for the MIPS
architecture. The following ideas present the future work based on the possibilities:
• vmsplice() attack: The current exploits are for the i86 architecture. The Arada Locomate
OBU is a MIPS architecture based device which uses different registers and commands. The
exploit needs to be developed for MIPS architecture and tested
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• JTAG: JTAG is a port for hardware debugging. Through JTAG port, firmware can be
modified to obtain root privileges on the system. Although, this exploit requires physical
access to the device.
• User as attacker: A user knowing this access and details of the device can take advantage
over the entire network and can act as an attacker. Future work can study this perspective
in depth.
• WPS: WiFi Protected Setup is a standard for secure wireless home networks. This aids in
securely connecting other devices to the home network. Usage of a PIN is one of the methods
in this protocol. Although this acts as a standard for wireless home networks, there were
major vulnerabilities found within the protocol. Brute-force attacks are possible, and it is
easier to develop for this protocol. Future work can explore these types of attacks.
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